Abstract / Since the abolition of the 50-years old authoritarian regime in Portugal in
term small state could be used for countries with a minimum of 100.000 and a maximum of 18 million inhabitants. With 10.5 million inhabitants and covering 92,028 km 2 , Portugal can be seen as a typical small state.
Portugal has close economic, political and cultural links with its next-door neighbour, Spain, and with its former colonies and territories such as Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, S. Tomé and Príncipe, East-Timor and Macau. Portuguese is the official language of the country. In the Northeast, there is nevertheless a small community (around 7.000 people) speaking Portuguese and Mirandês, a Romanic language recognized by the Portuguese state (Sousa, 2003) . There are naturally non-Portuguese speakers in the country, namely foreigners and immigrants, but the media and the state have not given particular attention to their linguistic specificities as Portugal is perceived as being homogeneous in linguistic terms.
In the broadcasting sector, the public service television, Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa (now Rádio e Televisão Portuguesa, RTP), was the unique television broadcasting company up until 1992. As a result of the break-up of RTP's monopoly, there are now four national terrestrial TV channels: two public service channels (RTP 1 and RTP 2) and two commercial channels (Sociedade Independente de Comunicação, SIC, and Televisão Independente, TVI), and two public service regional channels (one to The Azores and another one to Madeira). In addition to international TV channels (e.g. RTP Internacional, RTP África, SIC Internacional), presently RTP and other media groups produce content and run thematic cable channels such as RTP-N, RTP Memória, Sport TV, SIC Notícias, SIC Radical and SIC
Mulher.
Although the RTP's monopoly was only broken up in the early 1990s, throughout the 1980s the most affluent were able to buy satellite dishes and to receive dozens of foreign language television channels mainly from Eutelsat and Astra satellites. For a decade, satellite The present-day configuration of the media system in general and the broadcasting sector in particular is strictly interconnected with the development of multimedia groups in the country. With the opening up of television to the private sector and the privatization of state media property in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new media groups have joined traditional ones such as the Catholic Church and Impresa (formerly Controljornal). By the mid-1990s, Sousa (1994) has divided the existing media groups into three major sets: the historical by strong economic groups and banks, they became state property. The nationalization of the press was never explained as a political option. 'It was presented as an indirect consequence of the nationalization of the banking sector' (Mesquita, 1994: 368 1987--1995) undertook the most comprehensive changes in the media structure since 1974/75.
The first set of measures directly related to the structure of the media concerned the reorganization of the radio broadcasting sector. By the mid-1980s there were so many illegal radio stations operating that the government could no longer ignore it. Still, it was only in 1989 that 310 local frequencies were allocated. In the following year, two regional These structural changes have created unprecedented conditions for concentration.
With António Guterres as prime minister (1995--2002) , a new set of sectorial media legislation covering the press, radio and television was approved but no particular concern regarding media concentration is observable. The Press Law (Law nº 2/1999) stated that citizens have the right to be informed and this right is guaranteed through measures that prevent harmful levels of concentration (article 2(2)(a)). However, without quantitative limits on ownership or any reference to foreign capital, this law reveals a vague conception of source diversity and could not be effective. Indeed, in recent Portuguese history, no concentration operation in the press was ever forbidden.
Differently from the Press Law, the Radio Law (Law nº 4/2001) says that one person or company can only own up to five radio stations (article 7(3)). Despite quantitative limits, this law has been circumvented by media groups (Silva, 2004: 159--160) . In the television arena, the legal framework has evolved more significantly since the breaking up of RTP's monopoly. Initially, the 1990 Television Law (Law n.º 58/1990) said that no individual or company could own more than 25 % of the capital of one of the two new commercial channels and could not be involved in more than one national channel (article 9(2)). concentration, the present TV law has eliminated the qualitative argument against concentration: the protection of pluralism and diversity, considering only the economic perspective (article 4). In all these legislative acts, vertical integration in the sector, an important dimension to ensure pluralism, was never considered.
In fact, the opening up of the electronic media market created cross-media opportunities and economic groups have organized themselves to acquire state property, to buy existing companies and to launch new media products. In this highly volatile and ever changing media scenario, the legislators have acted as if media concentration should be accepted or even promoted. Source diversity was not high on the agenda and the setting up of multimedia groups was perceived as a natural (even desirable) development. Without an unambiguous concentration law and merely with sectorial legislation, no effective barriers were established to media concentration and the media regulatory bodies find it almost impossible to ensure that media concentration levels do not harm pluralism and diversity.
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The current government is, for the very first time, preparing a draft bill on media concentration which is now under public consultation. However, if it is approved, it is highly probably that no substantial changes in the market structure will take place. The government believes that media concentration levels do not deserve special concerns and the draft bill was designed accordingly. The unique objective of this legislation is said to be the promotion of the freedom and pluralism of speech and the safeguard of the editorial independence vis-à-vis the political and economic power in a context that, according to the government, is not preoccupying. The legislation is needed, states the draft bill, because the general regime of competition that rules operations of concentration has objectives that are predominantly economic. In any case, the draft bill also argues that defining limits to concentration would benefit the companies because it establishes a more favourable competition framework.
The legal duty to publicize the name of all shareholders of media companies is perceived by the government as a fundamental aspect of the draft bill. This might however be totally irrelevant as this obligation is contemplated in previous legislation and there seems to be no obligation for groups to publish integrated information on their assets (only the shareholders of enterprises). Integrated information could in reality guarantee a global view over the groups and their real dimension. The draft bill also establishes that horizontal limits to concentration are exceeded when one company has more than 50 % audience share in a given relevant market. In case of cross ownership, which is for the first time addressed by a legal text (since the 1976 Constitution), this new draft bill intends to establish limits in the second (to one third of the audience) and in the third (to 16.6 % of the audience) relevant market. If multimedia companies are in such situation, the legislation has the answer to their problem:
the selling off of a company or parts of the capital until no shareholder has a dominant position (30 % of the capital) or ---if groups do not wish to change their market structure ---the implementation of public mechanisms that would ensure independence and pluralism, Portugal 11 such as an ombudsman or more independent editorial statutes. The draft bill also addresses the vertical integration, guarantying the access of producers to distribution networks exploited by operators with more than 50 % of the market.
If approved as it stands, the concentration law is bound to be inconsequent in terms of market structure. First of all, because the legislator sees the status quo as unproblematic and the draft bill was planned accordingly. Secondly, because the law itself will eventually incorporate the necessary mechanisms to avoid the potential need to alter the market structure such as more independent editorial statutes or the institution of an ombudsman. Lastly, Article 23 of this law was particularly contested by the broadcasting operators because it contemplated that by the end of the 5th and 10th year after their licenses have been granted, the ERC shall prepare and make public a report on the compliance of operators with binding obligations and conditions, issuing due recommendations thereafter. Considering that the report of evaluations shall be taken into account in the future ERC's renewal decision, the operators believe that their programming freedom is at stake and have publicly contested what they perceive as unacceptable constraints. The new television law does not per se change the weak media regulatory tradition but, in legal terms at least, the ERC has a renewed force (clearer assessment criteria and legitimizing tools). Commercial channels are expected to take more seriously their social responsibilities in terms of content.
If generalist commercial television channels are supposed to do more in the future, the public service broadcasting operator, RTP, has, according to the socialist executive, special obligations in terms of diversity. For that reason, the government is working on a new contract for the public service concession. Presently under public consultation, the concession contract between the State and RTP is quite detailed in terms of programming diversity paying particular attention to children and young people and to information. Clause 6 states that RTP should provide a wide and varied programming which promotes cultural diversity and takes into account the interests of minorities. It should provide rigorous and plural information, programmes for children and young people and should guarantee cultural, educational and information programming for specific audiences. The unprecedented level of specify in the contract (ranging from programmes for specific age groups to themes and social actors' differentiation in news bulletins) suggests that the company might be made accountable for its actions. The ERC has also supervising responsibilities and the Parliament is supposed to be regularly informed on the RTP's performance.
In parallel with the government moves, the ERC has also taken interest on diversity or, more concretely on political pluralism. In this sphere, the new media regulatory body believes that the public service television channels have additional obligations. Therefore, in May 2007, the ERC has decided to do a study to 'rigorously and systematically examine through the number and nature of news items on which the government or political parties are the main actors if there is a equitable and plural treatment in the public service television information' (Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social, 2007b). The ERC intends to develop a model of monitorization for the television information, based on the selection of news according to their protagonists.
The conception of pluralism underlying this study is very narrow as it merely takes into account the formal political structures, leaving out complex social processes and highly differentiated political participation mechanisms. Implicitly, this study perceives political pluralism in broadcasting as a mirror of the parliamentary equilibrium. In a country with high abstention rates and new forms of public debate namely in new online interactive platforms, the public service broadcaster is expected to go beyond the equitable representation of political-party structures.
Smallness as a Protectionist Smokescreen?
In Portugal, little attention has been given to media diversity in general and in the broadcasting sector in particular. The constitutional prerogative prohibiting concentration of media and cross-media ownership was never adequately legislated and the media regulatory bodies have not had the necessary means or will to prevent concentration and to ensure content diversity in broadcasting. Indeed, despite the occasional political rhetoric, successive governments have acted as if media concentration should be allowed and eventually promoted. Subsectorial laws were bound to be inefficient in terms of cross-media ownership and the concentration law which is now under public consultation, if approved, is also meant to be inconsequent. If little was done in terms of source diversity, the recent attempts to actively promote political pluralism and cultural diversity in both commercial and public service broadcasting services are still incipient and tentative.
Despite the economic relevance of subsectors such as cinema distribution, music industry, television fiction and books (not even addressed by the concentration draft bill and ignored as vital sectors to define cross-ownership) that contribute to the financial strength of Portuguese multimedia groups, governments have been chiefly concerned with the political and societal influence of groups owning electronic media. The Balsemão group, Impresa (with SIC and thematic cable channels, particularly the news channel SIC Notícias), the Catholic Church (it has lost TVI but controls the powerful Rádio Renascença and has a strong presence in the regional press), Media Capital (with TVI, Rádio Comercial and Rádio Clube Português) , and Controlinveste (with the influential news radio TSF and daily newspapers Jornal de Notícias and Diário de Notícias) have been powerful forces that governments were not willing to face.
The vast majority of democratic governments since the mid-1970s have had precarious existences. Hence long-term media policies were unthinkable and challenging established media groups interests was certainly not amongst their political priorities.
So, governments had no interest in moving forward and the media regulatory bodies did not have the necessary means to enforce generalist diversity principles. The AACS, set up in 1998 and extinguished in 2005, was perceived as largely irrelevant mainly due to lack of political independence and inefficient procedures. Whether this perception is adequate or not, the fact remains that it gave sustenance to continued public scepticism and to a reduction of public expectations regarding the scope and performance of state media regulatory bodies.
Fifteen years after the AACS foundation, the new (by statute, 'public and independent') media regulatory entity, the ERC, has an accumulated legitimacy deficit and a long path ahead to transform itself into a socially relevant structure. The non-existence of a strong media regulatory culture in the country is strictly interconnected with the lack of political investment and determination. The state's intertwined forces had no objective interest in promoting diversity.
Looking back at the Portuguese media policy and regulation, it is difficult to establish a direct link between the smallness of the country and the lack of significant pro-diversity measures. This is not to say that the shortage of resources, small audience and advertising markets, and other dependencies that characterize small states did not play a role. However, in the Portuguese case, the political history and the configuration of the media policy network are central aspects if one wants to explain why pluralism and diversity have not been in the agenda. With the exception of the 1987--1995 period (when media reforms were effectively introduced), the Portuguese recent history has been marked by political instability and governments ---perceiving their own electoral fragility ---have been extremely cautious in relation to the media. This means that the proposition that small states tend to interventionism (meaning strong diversity regulation) does not seem to apply to the Portuguese reality.
If governments perceived action in this sphere as a political liability and turned a blind eye to diversity, the media groups have actively acted as a lobby to prevent legal and regulatory measures, arguing that concentration is crucial to ensure diversity of products and control over national media. Media owners have consistently argued for more autonomy from the state in order to pursuit their business objectives and media laws and regulation have always been regarded with suspicion. Concentration limits were (and still are) understood as an unacceptable interference in market mechanisms and pro-active diversity regulation is seen as state's illegitimate interference in programming freedom. The Chairman of the Impresa group, Pinto Balsemão, believed that there aren't too many groups in the country and argued for stronger Portuguese multimedia groups: 'strong media groups are necessary to counterbalance foreign investment in the area' (in Silva, 2004: 147) . Before the selling off of Media Capital to the Spanish group Prisa in 2005, the then CEO, Paes do Amaral, also publicly expressed the importance of strong media groups to guarantee that Portugal remained a decision centre in the media sector: 'I believe that in the media sector it is not desirable that the main media groups are controlled by Spanish media. It is not good' (in Silva, 2004: 165) .
This belief however did not prevent Paes do Amaral from selling off Media Capital to Prisa in
2005.
Although there is a very limited penetration of Spanish audiovisual products in the Portuguese broadcasting landscape, the fear of a Spanish offensive (today translated into Portugal 18 economic dominance) is ---for historical reasons ---deeply ingrained in the Portuguese imaginary and it has been used as a useful rhetoric by media owners. The need to maintain a domestic media landscape has been presented and accepted as a reasonable argument. Scale is therefore an important argument against source diversity particularly if ---the argument goes ---the defence of the Portuguese identity is at stake. Moreover, media concentration can even be presented as a condition for content diversity. The former head of the Lusomundo, Luís
Silva argued that concentration is a condition 'to keep the media alive': 'the Diário de Notícias newspaper would have had a complicated fortune if it was not integrated in a media group' and 'TSF would not exist today ---and it is a great media product ---without the inner strength of the group' (in Silva, 2004: 135) . The Portuguese case appears to be therefore in accordance with the protectionist perspective: industry and politicians argued against ownership regulation in order to protect Portuguese media companies.
Clearly, in Portugal, source and content diversity is formally a valued principle. Its relevance is expressed in the most important legal instruments and it is incorporated in governments' programmes and discourses. To this overt preoccupation however does not correspond pragmatic action. The media groups were allowed to develop their business strategies without effective barriers to their vertical and horizontal expansion and the generalist television channels could become de facto entertainment operators ignoring their own proposals during the licensing process. Indeed, despite the rhetoric, the status quo seems to serve both the state and the multimedia groups' economic interests.
